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On Nothing 
 
 
 A famous sonnet by the seventeenth-century Spanish poet Góngora, 
on the instability and inevitable decay of all human life, even the most 
beautiful, ends with an unforgettable evocation of the actual process itself of 
final human disintegration ‘into earth, smoke, dust, shadow, nothingness’ 
(‘en tierra, en humo, en polvo, en sombra, en nada’). The ‘extraordinary 
falling cadence’ (Arthur Terry) of this line, mirroring the transformation of 
human life on its final journey into annihilation, is clearly echoed at the end 
of the century by the last great poetic figure of the Spanish ‘Golden Age’, 
the Hieronymite Mexican nun, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, one of whose 
sonnets, describing a flattering portrait, ends with the memorable line: ‘it is a 
corpse, it is dust, it is shadow, it is nothing’ (‘es cadáver, es polvo, es 
sombra, es nada’). 
 
 Moving, even thrilling, though such images of human extinction, and 
of its inexorability, can undoubtedly be, they do also, by their sheer beauty, 
seem to undermine the straightforward message they appear so triumphantly 
to enunciate. It is almost as if language itself were incapable of 
encapsulating or incarnating fully convincingly the notion of ‘nothing’; even 
the idea of ‘nothing’, a moment’s reflection tells us, is itself ‘something’, 
and hence is itself a contradiction of the very thing that thought is trying to 
conceptualize. Both poetic imagination and prosaic analysis coincide 
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therefore, in this case, in suggesting the, at best, precarious status of the 
concept of ‘nothing’, if not its outright meaninglessness (‘the idea of an 
absolute nothingness has as much meaning as the idea of a round circle’, as 
Bergson has it1). 
 
 Language’s ‘happy fault’ in this respect, its failure to be able to 
conceive of ‘nothing’ may, for some perhaps, be a sad admission of the 
unfortunately inescapable reality of existence, the indestructibility of what 
Schopenhauer called the ‘will-to-live’. For others, the same fault will be 
seen to support rather than to subvert religion’s sense not just of the 
ontological superiority of life over death, or (more abstractly) of being over 
nothingness, but also of life’s inevitable, ultimate victory over death. Thus, 
even the baroque pessimism in which, for a Sor Juana, the high hopes of 
Renaissance humanism were finally buried, can be viewed dialectically as an 
affirmation of the pull of eternity. 
 
                                                 
1 Quoted in L. Kolakowski, Religion (Oxford: O.U.P., 1982), 74. 
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